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Quantification of operational risk has received increased attention with the 
inclusion of an explicit capital charge for operational risk under the new 
Basle proposal. The proposal provides significant flexibility for banks to use 
internal models to estimate their operational risk, and the associated capital 
needed for unexpected losses.  Most banks have used variants of value at risk 
models that estimate frequency, severity, and loss distributions.  This paper 
examines the empirical regularities in operational loss data.  Using loss data 
from six large internationally active banking institutions, we find that loss 
data by event types are quite similar across institutions.  Furthermore, our 
results are consistent with economic capital numbers disclosed by some large 
banks, and also with the results of studies modeling losses using publicly 
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1.  Introduction 
  Large operational losses as a result of accounting scandals, insider fraud, and rogue 
trading, to name just a few,  have received increasing attention from the press, the public, and 
from policymakers.  The frequency of severe losses, with more than 100 instances of losses at 
financial institutions exceeding $100 million, has caused many financial institutions to try to 
explicitly model operational risk to determine their own economic capital.  As financial 
institutions have begun to comprehensively collect loss data and use it to manage operational 
risk, bank regulators have increased their expectations for measuring and modeling operational 
risk.  Under the current US rules proposal for implementing the Basle Accord, large 
internationally active banks will be expected to use internal models to estimate capital for 
unexpected operational losses.  A criticism of this proposal has been that the tools for modeling 
operational risk are in their infancy, making estimating capital problematic. 
  This paper uses data supplied by six large internationally active banks to determine if the 
regularities in the loss data will make consistent modeling of operational losses possible.  We 
find that there are similarities in the results of models of operational loss across institutions, and 
that our results are consistent with publicly reported operational risk capital estimates produced 
by banks’ internal economic capital models. 
  We begin the analysis by considering tail plots of each bank’s loss data by business line 
and event type.  Three findings clearly emerge from this descriptive analysis.  First, loss data for 
most business lines and event types may be well modeled by a Pareto-type distribution, as most 
of the tail plots are linear when viewed on a log-log scale.  Second, the severity ranking of event 
types is consistent across institutions.  Clients, Products and Business Practices is the highest 
severity event type, while External Fraud and Employment Practices are the lowest severity  
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event types.  Third, the tail plots suggest that losses for certain business lines and event types are 
very heavy-tailed.  This last finding highlights that while basic measurement approaches such as 
the tail plot are easy to implement and intuitively appealing, overly simplistic approaches may 
yield implausible estimates of economic capital.   A main contribution of this paper is to show 
how quantitative modeling can result in more reasonable conclusions regarding tail thickness and 
economic capital. 
  We next attempt to model the distribution of loss amounts using a “full-data” approach, 
whereby one fits all of the available loss data with a parametric severity distribution.  We 
consider nine commonly-used distributions, four of which are light-tailed and five of which are 
heavy-tailed.  We fit each of these distributions by business line and event type at each of the six 
institutions considered.  The heavy-tailed distributions provide consistently good fits to the loss 
data, which confirms our findings based on visual inspection of the tail plots.  The light-tailed 
distributions do not generally provide good fits.  However, we find that some parameter 
estimates for the heavy-tailed distributions can have implausible implications for both tail 
thickness and economic capital.   
  Extreme Value Theory (EVT) is an alternative to the full-data approach that is 
increasingly being explored by researchers, by financial institutions, and by their regulators.  
However, it is well-known that EVT techniques yield upward-biased tail estimates in small 
samples.  Huisman, Koedijk, Kool and Palm (2001) have proposed a regression-based EVT 
technique that corrects for small-sample bias in the tail parameter estimate.  Applying their 
technique (hereafter HKKP) to the six banks in our sample, we obtain estimates that are both 
reasonable and consistent with earlier estimates using purely external data (de Fontnouvelle et. 
al., 2003).  
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  It is important to stress that the statistical analysis of operational loss data is a new field, 
and that this paper’s results should be viewed as preliminary.  This is particularly true since we 
only have data for one year from each bank.  The paper also raises several technical issues that 
should be addressed in future research as a longer time series becomes available.  The most 
significant such issue is that even though the data appear to be heavy-tailed, we cannot formally 
reject the hypotheses that they are drawn from a light-tailed distribution such as the lognormal.  
To investigate this possibility, we propose a threshold analysis of the lognormal distribution that 
to our knowledge is new to this paper.  This technique also provides a reasonable 
characterization of the tail behavior of operational losses. 
  We also examine the frequency of operational losses.  We consider both the Poisson 
distribution and the Negative Binomial distribution as potential models for the number of losses 
that a bank could incur over the course of one year.  Using Monte Carlo Simulation to combine 
the frequency and severity distributions, we obtain an estimate for the distribution of total annual 
operational losses.  The quantiles of this aggregate loss distribution are interpreted as economic 
capital estimates for operational risk.  These estimates should be viewed with several significant 
cautions.  First, we are assuming that the data are complete, however, banks have moved to more 
comprehensive data collection platforms which may improve the loss capture.  Second, we are 
only using internal data for one year, and banks will be required to have three years of 
comprehensive data.  Third, analysis of internal loss data will not be the sole determinant of 
capital for operational risk; banks will be also required to demonstrate that their risk estimates  
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reflect exposures that are not captured in internal loss data.
1  Given these qualifications, the 
estimates should be viewed as a preliminary indication of the amount of capital needed. 
  Despite these caveats, the estimates implied by the modeling of the internal loss data are 
consistent with capital estimates using purely external data (de Fontnouvelle et. al., 2003).  The 
results imply that for a variety of plausible assumptions regarding the frequency and severity of 
operational losses, the level of capital needed for operational risk for the typical (median) bank in 
our sample would be equivalent to 5-9 percent of the bank’s current minimum regulatory capital 
requirement.  This range also seems consistent with the 12-15  percent of minimum regulatory 
capital that most banks are currently allocating to operational risk, given that the banks’ models 
tend to have a broader set of model inputs than those used in this analysis, including, external 
data, scenarios and qualitative risk assessments. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a 
description of the data.  Section three reviews related literature on the measurement of 
operational risk in financial institutions.  Section four discusses some commonly used continuous 
distributions, and discusses their potential relevance to modeling the severity of operational 
losses.  Section five presents visual analyses of the loss data, and draws preliminary conclusions 
regarding which distributions may be appropriate for modeling loss severity.  Section six 
explores full-data approaches to modeling operational losses, and formally compares the 
alternative severity distributions.  Section seven explores EVT-based approaches to modeling the 
loss data.  Section eight compares alternative frequency distributions.  Section nine provides the 
                                                           
1 The proposed Basel accord requires banks to measure losses to which they are exposed, but that 
have not actually occurred (via analysis of “scenarios” and “external” data).  Banks would also 
be required to measure exposures that have arisen since the data collection period (via analysis of 
“business environment and control factors”).  
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implied capital numbers from estimating different loss distributions using Monte Carlo 




  The 2002 Operational Risk Loss Data Collection Exercise (LDCE) was initiated by the 
Risk Management Group (RMG) of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in June 2002.  
The LDCE asked participating banks to provide information on individual operational losses 
exceeding €10,000 during 2001, among various other data items.  Banks were also asked to 
indicate whether their loss data were complete.  The LDCE data include 47,269 operational loss 
events reported by 89 banks from 19 countries in Europe, North and South America, Asia, and 
Australasia.  For additional information and summary statistics regarding the LDCE, readers can 
refer to RMG (2003).   
  Based on the information provided in the LDCE, and on our knowledge of the banks 
involved, we identified a list of institutions whose data submissions seem relatively complete.  
Due to practical considerations, we limit our sample to loss data from six of these banks.  This 
paper presents results for these six banks on a bank-by-bank basis (with the exception of the 
operational risk exposure figures reported in Table 5).  However, the results are presented in a 
way that makes it impossible to identify the individual banks. Focusing on a cross-sectional 
study of banks enables us to determine whether the same statistical techniques and distributions 
apply across institutions that may have very different business mixes and risk exposures. 
  The LDCE categorizes losses into eight business lines and seven event types.  To protect 
the confidentiality of banks participating in the LDCE, we present results only for those Business  
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Lines and Event Types where three or more banks reported sufficient data to support analysis.  
The business lines presented are:  Trading and Sales; Retail Banking; Payment and Settlement; 
and Asset Management.  The loss types presented are: Internal Fraud; External Fraud; 
Employment Practices and Workplace Safety; Clients, Products and Business Practices; and 
Execution, Delivery and Process Management.
2 
 
3. Related literature 
  Moscadelli (2003) also analyzes data from the 2002 LDCE, and performs a thorough 
comparison of traditional full-data analyses and extreme value methods for estimating the 
operational loss severity distribution.  He finds that extreme value theory outperforms the 
traditional methods in all eight Basel Business Lines.  He also finds that the severity distribution 
is very heavy-tailed, and that there is a substantial difference in loss severity across Business 
Lines. 
  There are several differences between the current paper and Moscadelli (2003).  First, 
Moscadelli (2003) aggregates the data across all banks in the LDCE sample.  In this paper, we 
analyze data at the individual bank level in order to determine whether the same quantitative 
techniques “work” for a variety of banks with different business mixes, control infrastructures, 
and geographic exposures. We believe that doing so provides a useful test of the techniques 
under consideration, and also yields an indication of their ultimate applicability at individual 
banks.  Second, the current paper explores the newly-developed technique of Huisman et. al. 
                                                           
2 The following Business Lines were omitted:  Corporate Finance; Commercial Banking; Agency 
Services; and Retail Brokerage.  The following Event Types were omitted:  Damage to Physical 
Assets; Business Disruption and System Failure.  To preserve confidentiality, we do not report 
the cutoff that was used for inclusion of Business Lines and Event Types.  
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(2001) to correct for potential bias in the tail parameter estimate.  Third, we explore several 
models of the loss frequency distribution, which allows us to obtain indicative estimates of 
economic capital for operational risk. 
  
4. Distributions for operational loss data. 
  We begin our empirical analysis by exploring which of various empirical approaches best 
fits the data.  In principle, we are willing to consider any distribution with positive support as an 
acceptable candidate for modeling operational loss severity.  To keep the size of our tables 
within reason, however, we will focus on nine commonly used distributions.  This section 
discusses the salient features of each.  In section six, we consider how well these distributions 
describe the statistical behavior of losses in our database.   
TABLE 1 HERE 
  Table 1 lists each distribution we consider, together with its density function and its 
maximal moment (discussed at the end of this section).  We begin our discussion with the 
exponential distribution, which is one of the simplest statistical distributions – both analytically 
and computationally.  The exponential distribution is frequently used to analyze duration data 
(e.g., time to failure of a machine part), and is the only continuous distribution characterized by a 
“lack of memory.”  In the duration context, lack of memory means that the time until the 
occurrence of an event (failure) does not depend on the length of time that has already elapsed 
(time since installation).  In the operational loss context, lack of memory implies that the 
distribution of excess losses over a threshold does not depend on the value of the threshold.  So if 
half of all losses exceeding $1 are less then $10, then half of all losses exceeding $1 Million will 
be less than $1,00,010 ($1,000,000 + $10).  Such a result does not seem plausible.  However, the  
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exponential distribution arises in the context of Extreme Value Theory (EVT) as a possible 
limiting distribution for excess losses above high thresholds.  For this reason (and also because it 
can be transformed into other interesting distributions), we include it in our analysis. 
  The Weibull distribution is a two-parameter generalization of the exponential that allows 
the time until event occurrence to depend on the amount of time that has already elapsed.  Thus, 
the Weibull can capture phenomena such as “burn in,” in which the failure rate is high initially 
but decreases over time.  In the context of operational risk, the Weibull may be appropriate for 
modeling a business line exposed to many small losses but only a few large losses.  The Gamma 
distribution is another two-parameter generalization of the exponential.  A Gamma distributed 
random variable arises as the sum of n exponentially distributed random variables.  Thus, a 
machine’s failure time is Gamma distributed if the machine fails whenever n components fail, 
and if each component’s failure time is exponentially distributed.  Like the Weibull distribution, 
the Gamma also allows the time until event occurrence to depend on the amount of time that has 
already elapsed. 
  Another generalization of the exponential distribution can be obtained by exponentiating 
an exponentially distributed random variable.  The resulting distribution is called a Type I 
Pareto, and can also be referred to as a log-exponential or power-law distribution.  The lack of 
memory of the exponential distribution manifests itself as scale invariance in the Pareto 
distribution.  Roughly speaking, scale invariance means that data “look the same” no matter what 
the unit of measure (e.g., hundreds of dollars vs. millions of dollars).  So in the earlier example 
where half of all losses exceeding $1 were less than $10, half of all losses over $1 Million would 
be less than $10 Million.  Power law behavior has been observed in phenomena as disparate as 
city sizes, income distributions and insurance claim amounts, and has been an important research  
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topic for those interested in the behavior of complex systems (i.e., systems consisting of  agents 
linked via a decentralized network rather than via a market or social planner).  A variation of the 
Pareto distribution can be obtained by exponentiating a Gamma distributed random variable 
instead of an exponentially distributed random variable.  The result is referred to as the 
Loggamma distribution. 
  The Pareto distribution also arises in Extreme Value Theory as another limiting 
distribution of excesses over a high threshold.  In this case, the limiting distribution is given by a 
two parameter variant of the Pareto, which is known as the Generalized Pareto Distribution 
(GPD).  One commonly-used transformation of the GPD is obtained by raising a GPD-
distributed variable to a power.  The result is called the Burr distribution. 
  Another distribution that we consider is the Lognormal, which is so widely used that little 
discussion is required here.  However, it is worth noting that as the normal distribution is 
appropriate for modeling variables that arise as the sum of many different components.  It is also 
a worthwhile exercise to consider which types of operational losses may be characterized in this 
manner.  Consider, for example, losses arising from workplace safety lapses.  One could argue 
that the severity of these losses may be approximated by the lognormal distribution, as it is 
influenced by many factors, including weather, overall health of the injured party, physical 
layout of the workplace, and the type of activity involved.  The final distribution that we consider 
is the loglogistic, which is obtained by exponentiating a logistic distributed random variable.  
The Loglogistic is similar to the Lognormal, but may be more appropriate for modeling 
operational loss data because it has a slightly heavier tail. 
  We conclude this section by classifying the distributions discussed above according to 
their tail thickness.  This will facilitate interpretation of the estimation results, as the relevance of  
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a particular distribution to modeling operational losses will be suggestive of the relevance of 
other distributions with similar tail thickness.  There is no commonly agreed-upon definition of 
what constitutes a heavy-tailed distribution.  However, one such definition can be based upon a 
distribution’s maximal moment, which is defined as sup{r : E(x
r) < ∞}.  Maximal moments for 
the distributions under consideration are reported in Table 1.  In this paper, we will call a 
distribution light-tailed if it has finite moments of all orders, and heavy-tailed otherwise.  Under 
this definition four of the distributions being considered are light-tailed (Exponential, Weibull, 
Gamma and Lognormal), and the remaining five distributions are heavy-tailed (Loggamma, 
Pareto, GPD, Burr and Loglogistic). 
 
5.  Descriptive analysis. 
  This section considers several tools that provide a visual characterization of the loss data.  
Suppose one has a series of observations {xi} with a cumulative empirical distribution function 
denoted by F(x).  A tail plot is obtained by plotting log(1-F(xi)) on the vertical axis against log(xi) 
on the horizontal axis.  Figures 1 and 2 present tail plots of the six banks’ loss data by Basel 
event type and Basel business line, respectively. 
FIGURES 1 and 2 HERE 
Many of the tail plots show linear behavior.  This is quite interesting, as a linear tail plot implies 
that the data are drawn from a power-law distribution.  Furthermore, the slope of the plot 
provides a heuristic estimate of the tail parameter, as log(1-F(xi)) = -a log(xi) + c, where c 
denotes a constant. 
  Another feature of these plots is that the slopes associated with the seven Basel event 
types preserve roughly the same ordering across banks.  For example, Clients Products and  
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Business Practices is one of the heaviest-tailed event types for all of the banks where it is plotted 
separately.  Employment practices and workplace safety is always one of the thinnest-tailed 
event types.  While the tail plots by business line also suggest power-law tail behavior, there is 
no evident consistent cross-bank ordering of business lines.  We interpret this as initial evidence 
that risk may be better ordered by event type, but will revisit this issue later in the paper. 
  Each of the tail plots also indicates a reference line with slope of -1.  Many of the plots lie 
near or above this line, thus implying heuristic tail parameter estimates of one or higher.  These 
estimates highlight the shortcomings of using an overly simplistic approach to measuring 
operational risk:  tail parameters exceeding one suggest that the expected loss is infinite for many 
business lines and event types, and that the capital required for operational risk alone could 
exceed the amount of capital that large banks are currently allocating to all risks.
3  We will argue 
in this paper that the distribution of operational losses is not as heavy tailed as it first appears, 
and that it is possible to obtain reasonable estimates of regulatory capital for operational risk. 
  Another useful diagnostic tool is the mean excess plot.  The mean excess for a given 
threshold is defined as the average of all losses exceeding the threshold, minus the threshold 
value.  The mean excess plot reports the mean excess as a function of the threshold value.  The 
shape of the mean excess plot varies according to the type of distribution underlying the data.  
For example, a Pareto distribution implies a  linear, upward-sloping mean excess plot; an 
                                                           
3 The LDCE data suggest that a $100 Billion bank could experience 500 operational losses 
(exceeding $10,000) per year.  If these follow a Pareto distribution with a tail parameter equal to 
one, then Monte Carlo simulation of the aggregate loss distribution indicates capital of $5 Billion 
at the 99.9% soundness level.  Tail parameters of greater than one would imply capital levels 
several times larger than this figure.   
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exponential distribution implies a horizontal linear mean excess plot; and a lognormal 
distribution implies a concave upward sloping mean excess plot. 
FIGURES 3 AND 4 HERE 
Figures 3 and 4 present mean excess plots for loss data by event type and business line, 
respectively.  (Each curve has been rescaled in order to display the different business lines and 
event types together on one plot.  Thus, these plots cannot be used to risk-rank business lines or 
event types.)  Nearly all of the plots slope upwards, which indicates tails that are heavier than 
exponential.  Some of the plots are linear (e.g., event type 7 for bank B), which suggests a 
Pareto-like distribution.  Some are concave, which suggests a lognormal or Weibull-like 
distribution.  It is also difficult to establish a consistent pattern across either business line or 
event type.  Potentially, this issue would be less severe with more data. 
 
6.  Fitting the distributions. 
  In this section, we fit each of the distributions listed in Table 1 to the LDCE data via 
Maximum Likelihood.  Results are reported separately for each bank under consideration, and 
are also broken down by  business line and event type. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
Table 2 reports probability values for Pearson’s χ
2 goodness of fit statistic.
4  In general, the 
heavy-tailed distributions (Burr, LogGamma, LogLogistic, Pareto) seem to fit the data quite well.  
The reported probability values exceed 5% for many business lines and event types, which 
suggests that we cannot reject the null that data are in fact drawn from the distribution under 
                                                           
4 We calculated χ
2 goodness of fit tests because EDF-based tests can be sensitive to data 
rounding, which is prevalent in the LDCE data.  One can accommodate rounding within the χ
2 
test by choosing bin values appropriately.  
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consideration.  Conversely, most of the light-tailed distributions rarely provide an adequate fit to 
the data.  This is not surprising, as the tail plots suggested that most of the data are heavy-tailed.  
What is somewhat surprising is the degree to which the Lognormal distribution fits the data.  In 
fact, this light-tailed distribution fits the loss data for roughly as many business lines and event 
types as many of the heavier-tailed distributions. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
  Tables 3 presents parameter estimation results for the GPD and Lognormal distributions.  
To preserve bank confidentiality, we present only the estimate of the tail parameter ξ for the 
GPD and only the value of µ+σ
2/2 for the Lognormal distribution.  While the χ
2 statistics 
presented in Table 2 suggested that these two distributions provide a reasonable fit to the data, 
the parameter estimates generally suggest the opposite.  Panel A reports estimates of the GPD 
tail parameter ξ.  The parameter estimates are at or above one for many business lines and event 
types, and also above one when data is pooled across business lines and event types.  Note that a 
tail parameter of one or higher has implausible implications for both expected losses and 
regulatory capital.  Panel b of Table 3 reports the estimated value of µ+σ
2/2 for the lognormal 
distribution, which enables one to calculate the average loss severity via the formula 
exp(µ+σ
2/2).  While estimates of the average loss vary by business line and event type, one can 
see that it is less than exp(0) dollars for multiple business lines and event types.  Thus, neither 
the Pareto nor the Lognormal distribution consistently yields plausible parameter estimates. 
  Because of space considerations, we do not provide parameter estimates for the other 
distributions that were estimated.  However, the GPD is of special interest because of its role in 
Extreme Value theory, and the Lognormal is of special interest because it is the only light-tailed 
distribution that seems to fit the data (according to the χ
2 test.).  Parameter estimates for other  
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heavy-tailed distributions were qualitatively similar to those of the GPD, in that they had 
unreasonable implications for tail-thickness of the aggregate loss distribution. 
a. For which business lines and event types can full data be fit? 
  In this subsection, we ask whether there seem to be particular event types for which the 
full-data approach might work.  Losses due to Employment Practices and Workplace Safety 
(Event Type 3) are well fit by most of the heavy-tailed distributions as well as the lognormal.  
Furthermore, the parameter estimates for both the GPD and Lognormal are reasonable.  There 
are two event types (Internal Fraud; Clients, Products and Business Practices) where several 
banks’ data are well-fit by multiple distributions, but where the resulting parameter estimates are 
not reasonable.  External Fraud losses are not consistently well fit by any distribution on a cross-
bank basis.  Results for Execution, Delivery and Process Management are less consistent across 
banks, with two institutions failing the goodness of fit tests, but the others having good fits and 
(perhaps) reasonable parameter estimates.   
  The results are broadly similar in the case of estimation by business line. There are two 
business lines (Agency Services; Asset Management) that pass the goodness of fit tests, and 
yield reasonable parameter estimates for several banks.  Another business line (Retail Banking) 
fails the fit tests at most banks, and the final business line (Payment and Settlement) yields 
implausible parameter estimates. 
b. What might individual banks do? 
  Our discussion to this point has searched for features of operational loss data that hold 
across all of the six banks in our sample.  However, the measurement of operational risk will 
ultimately take place at individual banks, who may not have the luxury of seeing whether their 
choices and assumptions are also valid at other institutions.  We begin our discussion by focusing  
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on bank F.  Bank staff might begin by fitting one statistical distribution across all business lines 
and event types, but poor goodness of fit statistics would quickly lead them to alternate 
approaches.  They might consider fitting a separate loss severity distribution to each of the seven 
event types.  However, they would find that losses from the most frequent event type (External 
Fraud) were not well-modeled by any of the distributions.  The next most frequent event type 
(Clients, Products and Business Practices) is modeled quite well by several heavy-tailed 
distributions.  However, they would be quite surprised to find tail parameter estimates exceeding 
one, and might conclude that this was not a reasonable way to model operational risk.  If they 
next attempted to fit separate loss severity distributions for each business line, they would 
discover that loss data for the most common business line (Retail Banking) were not well-
modeled by any of the distributions considered. 
  Bank F was chosen at random for discussion.  If presented with their bank’s results from 
Tables 2 and 3, risk management staff from the other five institutions might reach similar 
conclusions.  They would discover that for many of the important business lines and event types, 
none of the statistical distributions considered adequately captured the behavior of operational 
losses.  They would also discover that some Business Lines and Event Types were well-modeled 
by heavy-tailed distributions, but that the resulting parameter estimates had implausible 
implications for their overall operational risk exposure. 
 
7.  Threshold analysis of loss data. 
  The previous section’s results suggest that it may be difficult to fit parametric loss 
severity distributions over the entire range of loss amounts, even if separate analyses are 
conducted for each business line and event type.  In this section, we focus on the largest losses,  
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as these are most relevant for determining a bank’s operational risk exposure.  The main 
theoretical result underlying this “Peaks Over Threshold” (POT) approach is that if the 
distribution of excess losses converges to a limiting distribution as the threshold increases, then 
this limiting distribution is either the Exponential distribution or the Generalized Pareto 
distribution. 
  Implementation of the peaks over threshold approach begins with choosing an estimator 
for the tail index parameter ξ, the most common being the Hill estimator.  The appeal of this 
estimator derives from its conceptual and computational simplicity.  For a set of losses exceeding 
a given threshold, the Hill estimator equals the average of the log of the losses minus the log of 
the threshold.  If the underlying loss distribution is a Type I Pareto, then the Hill estimator is the 
maximum likelihood estimate of the tail thickness parameter.  This property is quite useful, as it 
enables one to conduct likelihood ratio tests of various hypotheses.   
FIGURE 5 HERE 
 Let  k denote the number of observations exceeding a given threshold value.  The quantity 
k is often referred to as the number of exceedances.  Figure 5 presents plots of the Hill estimator 
for the six banks under consideration.  The solid black line represents the Hill estimator 
calculated across all business lines and all event types for various values of k between 1 and 200.  
Traditionally, the final estimate of the tail index parameter has depended heavily on the choice of 
k.  However, Huisman, Koedijk, Kool and Palm (2001) [hereafter HKKP] have recently 
proposed a regression-based enhancement to the Hill estimator that minimizes the role of 
threshold selection.  HKKP note that the Hill estimator is biased in small samples, and that the 
bias is approximately linear in k, so that 
   E[γ(k)] = ξ + c
 k, (1)  
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where γ(k) denotes the Hill estimator calculated using k exceedances, and ξ denotes the true 
value of the tail index parameter.  HKKP use (1) to motivate the following regression 
   γ (k) = β0 + β1k + ε(k), (2) 
which is estimated for k in {1, ... , K}.  The estimate of β0 is interpreted as a bias-corrected 
estimate of ξ.  This method also requires the researcher to choose the number of exceedances to 
include in the analysis.  However, HKKP conclude that the estimate of β0 is robust to the choice 
of K. 
  We apply the HKKP technique to the six Hill plots presented in Figure 5.  The results are 
presented in Table 4. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
The second column reports the number of exceedances (K) that were used to estimate the above 
regression.  HKKP suggest setting K equal to half the sample size N, and also note that the 
function γ(k) should be approximately linear over the range k = {1, ... , K}.  In results not 
reported, we found that setting K = N/2 would not be appropriate, as none of the six Hill plots 
were linear over such a wide range.
5  However, each of the plots in Figure 5 does indicate a 
range of k over which γ(k) is approximately linear.  We have chosen K accordingly. 
  The third column of Table 4 reports the estimate of β0 that was obtained using the 
“optimal” K.  The estimates vary between 0.50 and 0.86, which implies that the maximal 
moment α = 1/ξ varies between 1.16 and 2.00.  These findings confirm the intuition that 
operational losses have a heavy-tailed severity distribution.  The last row of the table reports 
results obtained for a sample consisting of all six banks.  Interestingly, the resulting parameter 
                                                           
5 To preserve the banks’ confidentiality, we do not report Hill plots using either N or N/2 
exceedances, as doing so would reveal the number of losses at each bank.  
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estimate of 0.68 is consistent with the results of de Fontnouvelle et. al. (2003), who reported tail 
parameter estimates of about 0.65.  This consistency is remarkable, given that de Fontnouvelle 
et. al. (2003) used external publicly reported loss data (rather than internal data), as well as 
substantially different empirical techniques than the current paper. 
  The final three columns of Table 4 report tail index estimates obtained using different 
numbers of exceedances in the regression procedure of HKKP.  For all six banks, the results do 
not change materially when the number of exceedances is reduced from K to 0.75K or 0.5K.  
The results change more when 0.25K exceedances are used.  Overall, Table 4 confirms that the 
estimation results are not highly sensitive to the choice of K. 
Estimation by business line and event type. 
  Our Hill plot analyses have thus far taken place at the “top of the house” level, where 
data are aggregated across both business line and event type.  It is reasonable to ask whether this 
approach is appropriate, or whether the tail behavior of the loss severity distribution might vary 
by business line and event type.  To investigate this issue, we calculated for each value of k (the 
number of exceedances) separate Hill estimators for each business line and event type.  For each 
k, we then calculated likelihood ratio test statistics for the hypotheses that the tail index is 
constant across business lines, and that it is constant across event types.  The probability values 
for these statistics are reported graphically in Figure 5.  The results indicate that both hypotheses 
can sometimes be rejected at the 10% level when k is near 200.  However, neither hypothesis can 
be rejected at the 10% level for values of k where the Hill estimator is constant (banks A, C and 
E) or decreasing (banks B, D and F).  Because choosing a small k provides a less biased value of 
the Hill estimator, segregating the analysis by business line or event type does not seem to be 
called for.  This finding does not mean that tail behavior of operational losses is constant across  
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business lines and event types.  Rather, the ability of statistical estimation techniques to 
meaningfully differentiate tail behavior across business lines is hindered by a lack of data on 
large losses using only internal data for one year, and by the concentration of these data in one or 
two business lines and event types. 
On the possibility of thin-tailed severity distributions. 
  The results presented in Table 4 suggest that loss severity distributions at the six banks 
under consideration have tail indices ranging between 0.5 and 0.86.  The reported standard errors 
also seem to exclude the possibility that ξ = 0, which would indicate a thin-tailed loss 
distribution.  However, the Hill estimator is designed for situations where ξ > 0.  Thus, it cannot 
be used to reject the hypothesis of a thin-tailed loss distribution.  This is an interesting 
hypothesis, because thin-tailed distributions such as the lognormal could have significantly 
different implications for capital than fatter-tailed distributions such as the Pareto. 
FIGURE 6 HERE 
  Dekkers, Einmahl and de Haan (1989) show how to extend the Hill estimator so that it is 
valid for any ξ in ℜ.  The graph of this estimator as k varies is commonly referred to as a DEdH 
plot.  Figure 6 reports DEdH plots for the six banks under consideration.  These plots indicate 
that for the low values of k for which the Hill estimator was constant or decreasing, we cannot 
reject the null of a thin-tailed severity distribution at any of the six banks.  This is problematic.  
The choice of fat versus thin tailed loss severity distribution will have significant impact on the 
capital calculation, yet based on limited data for only one year, available statistical techniques 
provide little guidance on which choice is more appropriate.  We expect that as banks 
accumulate more data on large losses, the DEdH plots will either be able to reject the null of   
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ξ = 0 or will indicate tail estimates close enough to zero that the choice does not matter so much.  
For now, we explore the empirical consequences of assuming a thin-tailed loss severity 
distribution. 
  Extreme value theory suggests that the exponential distribution is an appropriate choice 
for modeling loss severity under the thin-tailed assumption.  Thus, we wish to construct a 
threshold plot showing how the exponential parameter varies as the threshold increases (k 
decreases).  Because the maximum likelihood estimate of this parameter is given by the mean 
excess, these threshold plots would be identical to the mean excess plots already presented in 
Figures 3 and 4.  As was discussed earlier, the mean excess plots suggest that the exponential 
distribution does not provide an accurate description of the tail behavior of operational losses.  
All six banks’ excess plots are concave and increasing, whereas exponentially distributed data 
imply a linear and horizontal excess plot. 
  Since the DEdH plots do suggest that tail behavior of operational losses might be 
modeled with a light-tailed distribution, we consider whether some other such distribution 
provides a better fit to the data than the exponential.  Because the log-normal was the one light-
tailed distribution investigated in section six that provided a good fit across multiple banks, 
business lines and event types,  we investigate whether it might also provide a useful description 
of the tail behavior of operational losses. 
FIGURE 7 HERE 
  Figure 7 presents threshold plots for the six banks, under the assumption that losses 
above high thresholds follow a lognormal distribution.  For each value of k (the number of 
exceedances), estimates of the lognormal parameters were obtained via maximum likelihood.  
(Vertical axis scales have been omitted to protect data confidentiality.  However, a reference line  
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in Figure 7a indicates the location of µ=0.)  One can discern a common pattern in the estimates 
of µ and σ across all six banks.  For example, consider the plots for bank B.  Both suggest that 
the Lognormal is not a good fit for more than 100 exceedances, in that the estimates are unstable 
as k varies and the point estimate for µ is less than zero.  We have already argued that this is not 
a reasonable characterization of operational loss data.  However, parameter estimates are both 
stable and reasonable when 30 to 70 exceedances are used for estimation.  The µ estimate lies 
between 4 and 8, while the σ estimate lies between 0 and 2.
6  Three of the other banks display a 
similar pattern, with stable (and reasonable) parameter estimates emerging over high thresholds.  
The two remaining banks’ (C and E) POT plots become unstable for small numbers of 
exceedances.  This finding could indicate a small sample problem, but it could also indicate that 
the distribution of large losses at these banks does not follow a Lognormal distribution. 
 
8.  The operational loss frequency distribution. 
  We have thus far focused on the loss severity distribution, which describes the potential 
size of an operational loss, given that the loss has occurred.  Operational risk capital will also 
depend on the loss frequency distribution, which describes how many losses might actually occur 
over a given time period.  The Poisson distribution is a reasonable starting point for modeling 
loss frequency,  because it arises whenever the loss occurrence rate is constant over time.  We 
thus begin by modeling frequency at bank i by the following: 
   ni ~ Po(λi) (3) 
                                                           
6 The actual range of variation is significantly narrower, but has not been reported to protect data 
confidentiality.  
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That the Poisson distribution has only one parameter makes it particularly attractive in the 
current context.  The LDCE does not provide information regarding the date of an event, beyond 
the knowledge that all losses occurred sometime during the year 2001.  Thus, we have enough 
information to estimate the Poisson parameter, but not enough to estimate multi-parameter 
frequency distributions.  Maximum Likelihood estimates of the parameter λ are given by the 
annual number of loss events.
7 
  An interesting property of a Poisson variable is that the mean and variance are equal.  So 
if a LDCE bank were to report 10,000 loss events for the year 2001, we would expect (with 95% 
probability) it to report between 9,800 and 10,200 events the following year.  On an intuitive 
level, this seems like a very narrow range, and one might ask whether frequency should be 
modeled via a distribution permitting more variability than the Poisson.  One such distribution is 
the Negative Binomial, which is a commonly-used generalization of the Poisson. 
  As was discussed earlier, the LDCE data do not support estimation of two-parameter 
frequency distributions at the individual bank level.  In order to model excess dispersion in the 
loss frequency distribution, we take a cross-sectional approach.  That is, we estimate the 
following regression: 
  ni ~ F(Xi , b), (4) 
where F(·) is a discrete non-negative valued distribution, Xi is an observable characteristic of 
bank i (e.g., asset size), and b is a parameter vector.  Because our data set is purely cross-
sectional (i.e., there is no time series element), we cannot estimate any fixed effects. Fixed 
effects represent bank-specific variation in the frequency of operational losses, which could arise 
from factors such as the quality of an individual bank’s risk control environment.  However, it is 
                                                           
7 To preserve confidentiality, we have not reported the number of loss events.  
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worth noting that (3) can be interpreted as a fixed effects model.  Seen in this light, (3) and (4) 
are different but complementary ways of treating the fixed effects issue.  Under the latter, the 
expected number of events is purely a function of  a bank’s observable characteristics; whereas 
under the former, the expected number of events is purely bank-specific. 
  We begin by estimating (4) under the assumption that F(·) is the Poisson distribution, so 
that ni ~ Po(mean = bXi).  Setting each Xi as bank i’s asset size as of year-end 2001, we obtain an 
estimate of 8.2 for the parameter b.  This indicates that banks in our sample reported on average 
8.2 operational events for every billion dollars in assets.  Next, we estimate (4) under the 
assumption that F(·) is the Negative Binomial distribution, so that ni ~ NB(mean = b1Xi, 
dispersion = b2). We obtain an estimate of 7.4 for b1 and 0.43 for b2.   
 
9. The aggregate loss distribution.  
  In this section, we combine the severity results of section seven with the frequency 
results of section eight in order to estimate economic capital for operational risk, which is 
specified as the 99.9
th percentile of the aggregate loss distribution.  We explore two alternate 
assumptions regarding loss frequency (Poisson and Negative Binomial), and three different 
assumptions regarding loss severity (Pareto, Lognormal, and EDF).   
  We use Monte Carlo simulation to derive an estimate of the aggregate loss distribution as 
follows.  In the case of the empirical severity distribution, the number of loss events in year i is 
drawn at random from the frequency distribution, and is denoted Ni.  Then, Ni individual losses 
{l(1), ... , l(Ni)} are drawn from the empirical distribution.  The Ni losses are summed to obtain 
the aggregate loss for year i.  This process is repeated for one million simulated years in order to 
obtain the aggregate loss distribution.    
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  Monte Carlo simulation for the Pareto (Lognormal) severity distribution proceeds 
similarly, except that Losses in {l(1), ... , l(Ni)} greater than or equal to the relevant threshold 
value are replaced with random draws from the Pareto (Lognormal) distribution estimated in 
section six.
8  The Ni losses are then summed to obtain the aggregate loss for year i, and the 
process is repeated for one million simulated years in order to obtain the aggregate loss 
distribution.  The use of  Monte Carlo techniques in the current context has already been 
extensively documented, and we refer readers interested in further details to Klugman, Panjer 
and Wilmot (1998) and Embrechts, Kaufmann and Samorodnitsky (2002), and to their 
references.   
a.  Simulations based on a Poisson frequency distribution. 
  In this subsection, we assume that the frequency of operational losses follows a Poisson 
distribution with a fixed effects specification as in equation (3).  We make three different 
assumptions for loss severity: the Pareto, the Lognormal, and the empirical distribution.  Results 
are presented in panel a of Table 5.  To preserve the confidentiality of the banks in the sample, 
we scaled each percentile for each bank by that bank’s assets.  The cross-bank median for each 
percentile is then reported.   
TABLE 5 HERE 
  The Basel Committee has stated that “a reasonable level of the overall operational risk 
capital charge would be about 12 percent of minimum regulatory capital.”
9  If one estimates 
                                                           
8 For the Lognormal distribution, the relevant threshold is the same as that used for estimation of 
the tail parameter.  For the Pareto distribution, the relevant threshold is the largest observed loss 
value.  This is because by construction, the HKKP tail parameter estimate β0 corresponds to zero 
exceedances. 
9 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001).  
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minimum regulatory capital to be five percent of a bank’s assets, then a “reasonable” value for 
operational risk capital would be 0.6% of assets.  According to this criterion, the median value of 
0.468% reported in Panel a (for the 99.9
th percentile) seems reasonable.  It is also worth noting 
that our estimation is based solely on internal loss data for one year, providing limited data to 
estimate high severity losses.  Banks are also using external loss data and scenario analysis to 
provide additional information on the tail where they have insufficient high severity losses in a 
particular business line.  Thus, we would view the figure of 0.468% as somewhat of a lower 
bound on the banks’ true operational risk exposure. 
  The next set of simulations is conducted under the assumption that the severity of 
operational losses follows a lognormal distribution.  The results suggest that cross-bank median 
of the 99.9
th percentile is 0.07% of assets.  This figure seems small in comparison with both that 
obtained in the Pareto-based simulations, and with the 0.6% reasonableness criterion discussed 
above.   
  We conducted the final set of simulations by drawing the number of loss events from a 
Poisson distribution, and the loss amounts from the empirical severity distribution.  One may 
think of the resulting 99.9
th percentiles as a lower bound on the true capital requirement.  
Alternatively, one may think of these percentiles as representing the portion of capital that 
derives from banks’ actual loss experience, rather than from their exposure – as measured by a 
fitted distribution function which would also include information from external data and scenario 
analysis.  Because the lognormal is a thin-tailed distribution, the 99.9
th percentile based on the 
lognormal severity distribution exceeds that based on the empirical distribution by about 20%.  
Because the Pareto is a heavy-tailed distribution, the 99.9
th percentile based on the Pareto 
severity distribution exceeds that based on the empirical distribution by a factor of eight.  
  27
b.  Simulations based on a Negative Binomial frequency distribution. 
  In the previous section, we assumed that the frequency of operational losses followed a 
Poisson distribution.  We found that assuming a Pareto severity distribution yielded capital 
estimates that were mostly reasonable when judged against the Basel Committee’s expectation 
that operational risk account for 12% of minimum regulatory capital.  Assuming a lognormal 
severity distribution yielded markedly lower capital estimates.  In this section, we  investigate 
how these results change under the assumption that the frequency of operational losses follows a 
Negative Binomial distribution, as was discussed in section eight. 
  Panels b and c of Table 5 report quantiles of aggregate loss distributions that were 
simulated using cross-sectional frequency models based on the Poisson and Negative Binomial 
distributions, respectively.  (Note that the cross-sectional Poisson model is included because it is 
not informative to directly compare the cross-sectional Negative Binomial results with the fixed 
effects Poisson results, as differences could be due to either differences in the handling of effects 
or to differences in the assumed frequency distribution.)  The Negative Binomial specification 
implies significantly more variability in the number of operational losses than does the Poisson 
specification.  Thus, intuition suggests that the aggregate loss distribution should have a heavier 
tail under the Negative Binomial specification.  This intuition proves correct in the case of the 
lognormal severity distribution.  The median 99.9
th percentile is about twice as large under the 
Negative Binomial as under the Cross-Sectional Poisson specification.  However, intuition 
proves incorrect in the case of the Pareto distribution, for which the median 99.9
th percentile is 
not materially different under the Negative Binomial than under the Poisson.
10   
                                                           
10 It has been argued that intuition can be misleading if risks follow very heavy-tailed Pareto-type 
distributions (e.g., Embrechts et. al. (2002), Rootzen and Kluppelberg (1999)).  
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  Under the Negative Binomial specification of loss frequency, it is difficult to decide 
whether the Pareto or the Lognormal provides the more useful characterization of the loss 
severity distribution.  The difference between the two sets of results is within an order of 
magnitude, which may be considered close given the preliminary nature of the data and 
techniques.   
Conclusion 
  This paper examines operational risk modeling using only internal operational loss data.  
By focusing on internal data, it captures the potential modeling issues faced by banking 
organizations that have only recently started to collect comprehensive loss data.  The analysis 
indicates that the data do show statistical regularities, and that the severity ranking of event types 
is similar across banks.  The analysis also shows that the data is reasonably fit by heavy-tailed 
distributions (such as the Pareto), and illustrates that certain statistical methods yield plausible 
tail parameter estimates for these heavy-tailed distributions.  In fact, the tail parameter estimates 
for the severity distribution are quite close to the estimates based on publicly available time 
series of high severity losses (de Fontnouvelle et. al., 2003).   
  It is important to qualify our results by noting that they are based on only one year of loss 
data.  This limited data makes it difficult to distinguish between different distributional 
assumptions, though some thin-tailed distributions do appear inconsistent with the data.  At this 
point, we would conclude that a variety of threshold-based techniques seem to yield results that 
are consistently plausible across banks.  However, we may need to await the arrival of better data 
before making more definitive conclusions.  As banks have three or more years of good 
operational loss data, the ability to differentiate across alternative distributional assumptions 
should improve.  
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2] 1/bTable 2. Goodness of fit across Basel Business Lines and Event Types
All observations
Distribution Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F
Burr 0.0% 6.4% 72.0% 23.3% 13.6% 0.1%
Exponential 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Gamma 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0%
LogGamma 0.0% 1.5% 64.1% 33.9% 1.4% 0.7%
LogLogistic 0.0% 6.4% 79.4% 23.8% 2.1% 0.7%
Lognormal 0.0% 0.2% 51.8% 0.0% 3.5% 0.2%
GPD 0.0% 4.5% 75.8% 25.7% 1.6% 0.8%
Weibull 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 54.7% 0.0%
Event Type 1 - Internal Fraud
Distribution Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F
Burr 31.7% 86.1% 99.1% 13.0%
Exponential 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%
Gamma 12.2% 0.0% 73.4% 0.0%
LogGamma 32.7% 85.6% 98.1% 18.9%
LogLogistic 31.8% 87.4% 98.1% 13.6%
Lognormal 35.0% 86.4% 98.4% 13.7%
GPD 33.1% 87.6% 95.1% 13.3%
Weibull 74.9% 0.4% 40.9% 0.0%
Event Type 2 - External Fraud
Distribution Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F
Burr 0.0% 10.8% 6.4% 13.2% 1.7% 0.0%
Exponential 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Gamma 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 1.8% 0.0%
LogGamma 0.3% 6.5% 7.6% 7.3% 2.8% 0.0%
LogLogistic 0.0% 5.1% 5.8% 9.3% 2.7% 0.0%
Lognormal 0.0% 0.0% 6.6% 4.8% 3.0% 0.0%
GPD 0.0% 10.5% 6.1% 13.9% 1.7% 0.1%
Weibull 0.0% 0.0% 5.9% 0.1% 9.9% 0.0%
The following table reports goodness of fit for each of the distributions under consideration.  The 
test was based on a standard Chisquare procedure, except for the rounding adjustment discussed 
in section six.  The reported figures are Probability values, so that a value of 5% or less indicates 
a poor fit.Table 2. Goodness of fit across Basel Business Lines and Event Types
Event Type 3 - Employment Practices and Workplace Safety
Distribution Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F
Burr 87.2% 36.7% 85.0% 23.0%
Exponential 1.0% 0.0% 29.0% 0.0%
Gamma 66.5% 0.0% 86.9% 0.2%
LogGamma 88.1% 7.8% 74.7% 0.2%
LogLogistic 91.7% 59.5% 92.0% 24.5%
Lognormal 95.5% 57.1% 86.7% 24.8%
GPD 92.9% 64.4% 82.0% 35.2%
Weibull 87.0% 0.2% 85.8% 7.6%
Event Type 4 - Clients, Products and Business Practices
Distribution Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F
Burr 98.9% 58.0% 37.0%
Exponential 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Gamma 0.6% 0.0% 0.0%
LogGamma 80.1% 77.2% 42.2%
LogLogistic 80.8% 58.6% 39.0%
Lognormal 81.4% 36.5% 40.3%
GPD 76.7% 57.4% 34.7%
Weibull 50.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Event Type 7 - Execution, Delivery and Process Management
Distribution Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F
Burr 3.0% 1.1% 78.9% 24.7% 78.1% 72.6%
Exponential 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Gamma 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 19.8% 0.0%
LogGamma 0.8% 0.4% 54.7% 22.3% 26.6% 61.7%
LogLogistic 0.1% 0.0% 76.8% 47.7% 89.4% 77.3%
Lognormal 0.1% 0.0% 51.7% 52.1% 68.7% 0.0%
GPD 2.6% 0.0% 77.6% 39.8% 83.6% 89.6%
Weibull 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 47.1% 7.1%Table 2. Goodness of fit across Basel Business Lines and Event Types
Business Line 2 - Trading and Sales
Distribution Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F
Burr 1.6% 68.6% 88.1% 58.4%
Exponential 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 12.4%
Gamma 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 27.4%
LogGamma 0.0% 65.1% 70.6% 42.1%
LogLogistic 0.0% 69.7% 65.3% 91.8%
Lognormal 0.0% 67.0% 18.8% 86.9%
GPD 0.0% 70.6% 25.1% 58.0%
Weibull 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 18.3%
Business Line 3 - Retail Banking
Distribution Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F
Burr 0.1% 12.5% 32.3% 8.5% 0.9% 1.7%
Exponential 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Gamma 0.0% 0.0% 8.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0%
LogGamma 0.0% 0.2% 43.0% 1.3% 5.8% 2.4%
LogLogistic 0.0% 0.0% 35.2% 0.2% 5.6% 3.7%
Lognormal 0.0% 0.0% 46.9% 0.0% 5.5% 3.8%
GPD 0.1% 12.5% 32.2% 9.0% 2.4% 4.7%
Weibull 0.0% 0.0% 15.5% 0.0% 14.7% 0.0%
Business Line 5 - Payment and Settlement
Distribution Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F
Burr 48.5% 11.0% 69.2%
Exponential 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Gamma 0.0% 7.2% 1.7%
LogGamma 66.7% 40.2% 62.0%
LogLogistic 49.4% 22.7%
Lognormal 63.0% 38.5% 63.4%
GPD 45.3% 11.1% 66.8%
Weibull 0.3% 13.3% 52.4%
Business Line 7 - Asset Management
Distribution Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F
Burr 64.9% 84.4% 30.1% 20.2%
Exponential 6.4% 0.0% 3.6% 0.0%
Gamma 32.3% 0.0% 43.4% 0.0%
LogGamma 31.3% 79.9% 15.9% 17.6%
LogLogistic 63.1% 63.6% 44.9% 17.4%
Lognormal 45.9% 62.6% 69.8% 18.2%
GPD 67.5% 64.2% 61.1% 20.8%
Weibull 25.7% 4.5% 44.8% 2.3%Table 3. Parameter estimates for the Generalized Pareto and Lognormal distributions.
Panel a. Estimates of the tail parameter ξ for the GPD.
All BL & ET 1.28 (0.08) 0.87 (0.03) 0.99 (0.08) 0.92 (0.07) 0.97 (0.11) 1.01 (0.03)
ET1 - IntFrd 1.24 (0.36) 1.31 (0.18) 1.10 (0.38) 1.02 (0.14)
ET2 - ExtFrd 1.17 (0.12) 0.79 (0.05) 0.63 (0.19) 0.69 (0.07) 0.86 (0.14) 0.93 (0.03)
ET3 - EP&WS 0.50 (0.16) 0.42 (0.05) -0.15 (0.22) 0.50 (0.06)
ET4 - CPBP 1.36 (0.21) 1.25 (0.15) 1.46 (0.13)
ET7 - EDPM 1.42 (0.16) 0.71 (0.05) 0.94 (0.08) 1.00 (0.18) 0.96 (0.17) 0.93 (0.09)
BL2 - T&S 0.68 (0.06) 1.18 (0.13) 0.49 (0.18) 0.42 (0.28)
BL3 - RetBnk 1.15 (0.10) 1.09 (0.05) 0.55 (0.17) 0.94 (0.07) 0.99 (0.14) 0.93 (0.03)
BL5 - P&S 1.06 (0.23) 1.07 (0.35) 1.03 (0.29)
BL7 - AsstMgt 0.49 (0.20) 0.96 (0.21) 0.37 (0.18) 1.64 (0.40)
Panel b. Estimates of µ+σ
2/2 for the Lognormal distribution.
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> 0        
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-7.45       
> 0        
> 0        
-22.68       
> 0        
-13.32       
-8.35       
> 0        
> 0        
-9.64       
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank D Bank E Bank F
-6.08       
-9.85       
Bank E Bank F
-5.85       
-21.51       
> 0        
-9.61       
Bank A Bank B Bank C Bank DBank ID "Optimal" K K 0.75K 0.5K 0.25K
A 180 0.823 0.794 0.817 0.717
(0.016) (0.020) (0.030) (0.042)
B 80 0.628 0.591 0.565 0.313
(0.020) (0.022) (0.029) (0.016)
C 30 0.859 0.824 0.952 1.032
(0.085) (0.097) (0.182) (0.353)
D 50 0.498 0.405 0.456 0.415
(0.019) (0.015) (0.028) (0.039)
E 200 0.552 0.534 0.558 0.488
(0.003) (0.008) (0.013) (0.018)
F 50 0.633 0.538 0.536 0.342
(0.030) (0.019) (0.038) (0.026)
All 140 0.681 0.554 0.419 0.305
(0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.015)
Table 4.  Tail parameter estimates based on the HKKP method.
The following table reports tail index estimates calculated under the HKKP regression 
algorithm.  The "Optimal" number of exceedances (K) is chosen to correspond to the linear 
portion of the Hill plot.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
# of exceedances used in estimationTable 5.  Quantiles of the simulated aggregate loss distribution.
Panel a. Poisson frequency distribution - fixed effects model.
Severity Distribution 95 99 99.9
Pareto 0.066% 0.117% 0.468%
Lognormal 0.047% 0.056% 0.070%
Empirical 0.047% 0.053% 0.058%
Panel b. Poisson frequency distribution - cross-sectional model.
Severity Distribution 95 99 99.9
Pareto 0.106% 0.148% 0.362%
Lognormal 0.089% 0.101% 0.121%
Empirical 0.086% 0.093% 0.102%
Panel c. Negative Binomial frequency distribution - cross-sectional model.
Severity Distribution 95 99 99.9
Pareto 0.166% 0.237% 0.400%
Lognormal 0.143% 0.198% 0.273%
Empirical 0.146% 0.202% 0.273%
The following table reports quantiles of the simulated aggregate loss distribution.  To 
preserve the confidentiality of the banks in the sample, we scale each percentile for each 
bank by that bank’s assets. The cross-bank median for each percentile is then reported.  
Panel a presents results under the assumption that loss frequency follows a Poisson 
distribution whose parameter is estimated separately for each bank (fixed effects model). 
Panel b presents results under the assumption that loss frequency follows a Poisson 
distribution whose parameter is a linear function of each bank's asset size (sross-sectional 
model).  Panel c presents results under the assumption that loss frequency follows a 
Negative Binomial distribution whose parameter is a linear function of each bank's asset 
size. (Cross-sectional model.) 
Percentiles of the Aggregate Loss Distribution
Percentiles of the Aggregate Loss Distribution
Percentiles of the Aggregate Loss DistributionFigure 1.  Tail plots of loss data by Basel Event Type.
Event Types are labeled as follows.  1 - Internal Fraud.  2 - External Fraud.  3 - Employment Practices and Workplace 
































7Figure 2.  Tail plots of loss data by Basel Business Line.
Business Lines are labeled as follows.  2 - Trading and Sales.  3 - Retail Banking.  5 - Payment and Settlement.  


























7Figure 3.  Mean excess plots by Basel Event Type.
Event Types are labeled as follows.  1 - Internal Fraud.  2 - External Fraud.  3 - Employment Practices and Workplace 
































7Figure 4.  Mean excess plots by Basel Business Line.
Business Lines are labeled as follows.  2 - Trading and Sales.  3 - Retail Banking.  5 - Payment and Settlement.  
























7Figure 5. Hill plots of the tail index parameter.
The following are Hill plots of the tail index parameter for the six banks under consideration.  The thick dark line 
indicates the point estimates of the tail parameter as the number of exceedances varies between 1 and 200.  The thin dark 
lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates.  The thick, medium gray (light gray) line indicates P-









































































100.0%Figure 6. DEdH plots of the tail index parameter.
The following are DEdH plots of the tail index parameter for the six banks under consideration.  The solid line 
indicates the point estimates of the tail parameter as the number of exceedances varies between 1 and 500.
The dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates.































































































































































 Figure 7a.  Threshold plots of the lognormal parameter µ.
The following are threshold plots of the lognormal parameter µ for the six banks under consideration.  The solid 
line indicates the point estimates of µ as the number of exceedances varies between 10 and 200.  The dotted lines 
indicate 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates.  Labels are omitted from the vertical axis to preserve 
confidentiality.
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 Figure 7b.  Threshold plots of the lognormal parameter σ.
The following are threshold plots of the lognormal parameter σ for the six banks under consideration.  The solid 
line indicates the point estimates of σ as the number of exceedances varies between 10 and 200.  The dotted lines 
indicate 95% confidence intervals for the point estimates.  Labels are omitted from the vertical axis to preserve 
confidentiality.
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